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The implication of transcendental subjectivity

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Universal transcendental subjectivity contains its true being as actuality and potentiality of universal self-cognition within itself. As actualizing itself it is an endless process of acts, the correlate of which is the endless transcendental science. The universe of positive sciences as the scientific world cognition, the correlate of which is the world’s true being with the truly being humanity, is implied in a transcendental way in it: The world <is> the correlate of the world science possibly to be formed in infinity, which for its part is implied in humanity as to be formed by humanity. Humanity, world cognition as world science and world itself are correlates. The correlation of transcendental subjectivity and cognition, the science of transcendental subjectivity, is objectivized, made worldly in this correlation.

Concretely (in its concrete infinity as an existing one) transcendental subjectivity, the life of cognition of transcendental subjectivity as its actuality and potentiality of concretely full (infinite) self-cognition, transcendental philosophy as universal science considered as a whole are correlates, I said, and are one in inseparable coincidence. Not inseparably one as a combination of beings that are outside one another due to which rigid necessity ever, but “coinciding”, separable and yet in identity in a certain way.

The cognizing infinite process, proceeding in its potentiality, and this itself is in transcendental subjectivity; it is itself transcendental-subjective according to single acts as mental processes and as a whole. But as a whole and taken in a concrete way it also contains it itself completely, in its full concretion. One is part of the other, the part and the whole coincide. Cognition is an intentionality, and not every way of consciousness is cognizing in the finiteness – in the true sense, in which scientific cognition is understood. But universal true [455] cognition as a transcendentally-universal one is universal cognition of consciousness as such in all actuality and possibility and in totality, and, which is the same, is cognition of the concrete transcendental subjectivity simply as the totality of consciousness.

As that it also implies each and every cognizing consciousness. The universe of cognition (and correlatively the universe of transcendental science) implies the universe of all consciousness, and this implies the universe of cognition. Again it must be like this with regard to world and world cognition, being in the world and cognizing world, which for its part implies the world as a cognized one. And likewise it seems with regard to cognizing humanity and world cognition and world science and world itself. Nay, one will say, “conception of the world” of men remains itself always differentiated in the world, men of scientific world intuition, world, men, and can never arrive at actual coincidence? To consider the circumstances in ideal infinity means: not to remain in the factum, but to create ideas and circumstances of ideas.

Certainly, we need to necessarily distinguish between the being itself and the respective mental processes of perception, mental processes of memory, etc. as the respectively subjective ways of appearance of the actual being and this itself; likewise the identifying acts, in which we identify the appearing in different perceptions, memories, etc., and the identical being itself; that which is thought in respective predicative acts of thinking, that which is intellectually seen in respectively seeing acts, and the thoughts, sentences, judgments themselves, or rather, the truths themselves, that are respectively seen there. Thereby also [we need to distinguish between] the judgments themselves and truths themselves and the truly being objects themselves, on which the judgments are judgments and the truths are truths; the predicates themselves (the objective conditions themselves), the <in> truth “corresponding” ones of the objective substrates, which are truly stated ones in the truths.

But all that, which we distinguish there, is again our respective distinguishing of something distinguished. We distinguish again that which is distinguished in respective distinguishing and the [456] distinguished itself, in itself, and the distinction itself. Thus we always distinguish the *cogito* and the *cogitatum*, and the *cogitatum qua cogitatum* and the *cogitatum* itself, being actuality in itself (or, if we made a mistake, not being), and the actual in itself and the truly actual being as being in itself, and on the other hand the being a mistake, being obviously, being-not-in-truth. All this is again in the respective *cogito cogitatum*, namely in respective acts of critique being related to that, the verifying decision as actual, the depreciating decision as not actual, especially the one grounded in an intellectually seeing way in the intellectually seeing grounding.

If we contrast sensuous perception as the lowest basis, perceptive ways of appearance and the perceived thing itself, we distinguish by stating the manifoldness of actual and possible perceptions, our manifold own ones and the optional ones of other subjects, and the thing “of actuality” itself, then the manifold appearances of the subjects respectively experiencing in a single and possibly common way as well as these themselves are stated “being” ones; and contrasted to that the being “in itself” of manifold appearances, which is something perceived by the subjective perceptions of the appearances.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Of course we then distinguish between the perceived “as such” in every perception, which as a sense is usually meant in it itself in the mode certainty, and is inseparable from it (as in every *cogito* its *cogitatum*), and the being one itself and in itself. Initially this is itself only something “being” for us, simply with the sense, made outstanding in this contrast, as something meant with the help of this differentiation. It refers us to different perceptual appearances we bring to a synthesis of identification by combining them, whereby we see something identical, a same thing as something [457] appearing in the different appearances of the appearances; but this identical is itself again something meant of the identifying, and again we need to differ a meant identical thing and something actually, truly identical, no less though in the identifications as mental processes being for their part.

Like ever again differentiated, we need to ever again reflect on this as a cogitating of the cogitating one and of these and those, and eventually of as many cogitating ones ever, and ever again the differentiated is “meant” as something being and is to be contrasted with the meant in formally analogous differentiations: actual being and possibly not actual [being], but in such a way, that something being is initially always “meant”, and, questioned, must lead towards a definite answer, whether it is actual or not, unfortunately though this is an opinion as well, the truth of which can be questioned.

However far we go, we can perform a reflection iteratively, and thereby go on again *in infinitum*. We always have an opinion in the most different modes, have something accepted in certainty, being for us, and this being is always for us in relation to the manifoldness of actual and possible modes of subjective appearance, modes of givenness. And considered more closely they are not de facto groups of appearances and as possible ones merely <such [groups]>, which we may de facto create – and not only we as these ones, de facto being here and being known to each other; we rather obviously have an endless horizon of possible appearances everywhere, related to us actual ones, and as actually being accepted by us as known to us -, but of further and ever further subjects to be extended into the open infinity, open-endless manifoldness of the subject, into which we <intrude> as core of the actual ones and being conscious of us as actuality in this horizon of indefiniteness, possibly meeting each other respectively, open infinities of manifoldness of appearances, of subjective opinions, combined by their being able to enter into syntheses of identity, and among them especially those, to which evident verifications belong, being themselves again infinity of possible acts of verification though, etc.

[458] All this ever again leads to something being on different levels, to something being, beginning on the lowest [step], where something being is given as something objectively really experienced. And spoken in a quite formally and general way:

Wherever we speak of something being, we are within a horizon of differentiations between opinion and something meant, something meant in a verified way and <meant> in a not verified way, of cognition and something cognized, etc.:

And is it different with regard to the transcendental subjectivity and its transcendental self-cognition? Meanwhile, is something being not something truly and actually being, and is this not an idea? What is then the relation between the idea “world” with its corresponding correlations and the idea “transcendental subjectivity”? And its correlations? The human cognition belonging to the world is a transcendental one made worldly; like man is a transcendental subjectivity made worldly, thus correspondingly in the single case, and above all, in the totality, worldly spoken, of humanity. But what sense may this have?

Ideas as poles of endless processes of actual and possible actualization – ideas considered as being actualized -, where and when may this make sense? World is always in our acceptance as a being one – in all-temporality, but it is a pole of unity (pole of poles), whereby we have to differentiate the world being accepted in the What and How of its acceptance and the being world, world itself in its truth. But this “lies within infinity”, therein thus man and humanity as well.

Is not likewise transcendental subjectivity an idea and lying within infinity as being “in truth”? If we consider that all transcendental self-cognition of the monad-all, as functioning and considered as continued in the endless process (thus in a certain way as approximation to its idea), is objectivated in infinity as a humanity-like, transcendental science in the process of approximation, as a human science in its process, that is, is objectivated in such a way, that it becomes the psychic of all cognizing men functioning thereby, the human-psychic being. This has the result that the world and science of the world and humanity, human consciousness [459], human cognition and truth, considered *sub specie infiniti*, coincide with the transcendental subjectivity as an idea, as in its ideally true being (or as “transcendental world”). My human I becomes the transcendental Ego, coincides with it, both taken in “complete truth”. If we free ourselves from finiteness, the differences disappear.

This of course needs to be understood the following way: By my performing transcendental reduction and initiating transcendental cognition, I gain the transcendental interpretation of my human-personal being and of the world being accepted by me, and the world-life, the world-cognition becomes straightforwardly performable again through the uptake of its transcendental sense. The world and especially something human-psychic now takes up all transcendental life, which I, the transcendentally phenomenologizing one, perform, and among that my cognizing, and this holds also true for my fellow phenomenologists now possible and possibly actual for me. Eventually: The interpretation of all human personality, of all human consciousness, of [all human] life from transcendental cognizing necessarily inserts in them the life, constituting in a hidden way, of deeper performances properly constituting the world, thus an on-going process of making worldly the ever newly discovered transcendental thing. This making worldly though is nothing else, but the one that has always been performed prior to that, simply as a world constitution. It has not been discovered though, has not become transcendental self-cognizance currently. Psychology thus is never to be concluded in infinity, the otherwise covered infinities are disclosed by the transcendental attitude. A world science without transcendental world consideration is only seemingly some completely concrete world cognition. But it would certainly be wrong to look at the idea of universal concrete world cognition as a pole of approximation according to the mathematic knowledge of nature.

1. If we make a statement on the unity and manifoldness of the experiencing and thinking, then the statement shall of course be true – objectively true. The cognition of theoretical truth shall not be a momentary meaning and an opinion therein, a momentary intellectual seeing and something seen therein, but identically in optional repetition, and thereby in an optional one, in connection with every other one following in understanding and following in seeing, and repeating. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)